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Nationality and Religiosity.
Three theories about the birth of nations, which belong to Ernest Gell-
ner1, Benedict Anderson2 and Anthony Smith3, can be spotted on the map 
of the 20th century thinking. On the one hand, these theories summarized an 
existing discussion4 but, on the other hand, they laid the foundation to a new 
discourse on the origin of nations and national consciousness.
According to these three theories the nationalism, or more precisely, 
the idea of a nation is an artifact and its emergence is connected with cer-
tain socio-political and cultural events in the history of the mankind. This 
is the point of agreement where these theories stop being similar and start 
diverging.
Gellner defined nationality as a political principle which holds that the 
political and national should be congruent. This is a completely new prin-
ciple, which is characteristic for modernity. Prior to that the states were not 
organized by national features5.
Gellner distinguishes three stages in human history: the hunter-gath-
erer, the agro-literate and the industrial: nationalism appears in the transi-
tion from the agro-literate culture to the industrial stage. In the agro-literate 
stage, the ruling classes benefit from cultural diversity as in such a situation 
there is no challenge to their power.
In industrial societies, a high culture defines the whole of society and 
needs to be sustained by the polity. In industrial society, the changing nature 
of work demands cultural homogeneity. This means that there is a need for 
impersonal, context-free communication.
Moreover, an industrial society depends on perpetual growth in order 
to satisfy needs. Perpetual growth can only be achieved by perennial shifts in 
the occupational structure. The high level of technical skill required means 
that many positions must be filled meritocratically. This necessitates a kind 
of egalitarianism and at the same time, necessitates general training before 
specialized training, in order to allow exchanges and shifts in occupation.
Thus, education occupies an important place. Education starts to de-
fine the status of an individual, whereas in agro-literate societies kinship sta-
tus was the defining factor. 
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The state, therefore, fuses the state and culture together. That is why 
there emerges a need to compete for overlapping cultural catchment areas, 
and nationalism is the only way of competing effectively for these areas.
Anderson’s Imagined Communities was published in the same year as 
Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983). The basic premise of Anderson’s 
theory is that the decline of religion made it possible new conceptions of 
time, which in turn made it possible to imagine the nation.
Before nationalism, there existed the “great religiously imagined com-
munities”, such as, for example, Christendom, which was based on shared 
language (for e.g. Latin). Along with the spread/enhancement, Europeans 
came to realize that their conceptions of existence are not the only ones. 
Moreover, the factor of Latin, as of a shared language start declining and the 
so-called vernaculars start reviving. 
Whilst Europe existed as the great religiously imagined communi-
ties, the conception of time was one in which history was fused together. The 
past, present and future were not linked causally, but through the will of the 
divine. Within such a conception of time, the word “meanwhile” can have no 
meaning. With the dissolution of such communities, it became possible to 
imagine a state in which there was no longer “simultaneity along time” but 
“homogenous, empty time”. This type of time could be marked by clock and 
calendar, and was responsible for theoretically incidental coincidence. 
Then an era of print capitalism “came”. After a while, the monopoly was 
lost by Latin and new works were published in the vernacular. Protestantism 
and its emphasis on internal salvation was particularly important here. Books, 
newspapers and novels in vernacular languages gave the idea to their readers 
that there existed, simultaneously in time, a group of readers like them con-
suming cultural manufactures. 
These manufactures gave the readers a sense of national consciousness 
in three ways:
1. They created unified fields of exchange 
between Latin and vernaculars; 
2. They gave a new fixity to the language and thus 
helped give an idea of permanence to the nation; 
3. They created languages of power different to 
the pre-existing language of Latin. 
Anderson claims that nationalism is the result of the fusion between 
the secularization, human diversity, the development of capitalism and the 
technology of print.
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Smith’s theory is based on “ethno-symbolism”. Smith was a student of 
Gellner and attempted to overcome those difficulties in Gellner’s modern-
ist perspective. 
A key weakness of the modernist perspective is that it fails to account 
for the passions generated by nationalism: why people fight and die for their 
nation, when nationalism is only a tool created by the elites for the purpose 
of economic gain and economic cohesion?
Smith argues that nationalism draws on an attempt of a concrete 
“group” to fashion the history into a sense of common identity and shared 
history. This does not mean that the history should be academically valid or 
cogent - indeed, Smith asserts that many nationalisms are based on histori-
cally flawed interpretations and tend to entirely mythologize certain parts of 
own history.
Nationalism, according to Smith, does not require that members of a 
“nation” should all be alike, only that they should feel solidarity to the nation 
and other members of their nation. A sense of nationalism can be produced 
from whatever dominant ideology exists in a given locale. Nationalism builds 
on pre-existing kinship, religious and belief systems. 
All these three theories consider the nationalism and the birth of a na-
tion from three different perspectives: constructionist (Gellner), traditional-
ist (Smith) and reductionist (Anderson). All these three theories, however, 
have significant flaws - as Smith notes quite rightly none of the theories ex-
plains why people kill each other for the nation and national idea. Neither 
does Smith’s theory, which says that the nationality, in its essence, is a sense 
of solidarity and the solidarity can be the feeling for which people may sac-
rifice themselves.
*       *      *
We should here touch upon a mythology which originated in the 19th 
century and is linked to the development of the concept of unconscious. At 
that time, the concept of unconscious seemed to be the only explanation to 
the indignation and rebellion of masses. In his “Totem and Taboo”, Freud 
wrote that the only explanation to the psychology of masses (people) is the 
existence of mass psyche and the accumulation of experience in mass psyche6. 
In order to explain the circumstances being of concern to intellectuals at the 
turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, it was necessary to acknowledge a common 
psychology in a nation, people, i.e., to acknowledge the existence of some-
thing common and irrational that somehow passes from fathers (or mothers) 
to children and further down to next generations and makes masses act as an 
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organism. Consequently, the 19th century mythology about nations says that 
there is something common with bits of it ingrained in people, which mate-
rializes when people get together. In the 19th century, intellectuals started to 
realize that apart from concrete individuals there are communities whose ac-
tions, under certain circumstances, may even have a demolishing effect. This 
was an entirely new social fact which for them. They had never before come 
upon any explanation to that fact in their education or experience. To find a 
“quick” explanation it was quite logical to view masses, people, as an organism 
and acknowledge the existence of psychic (conscious) as well as unconscious 
in this organism. The most influential thinkers of the 19th century - Freud, 
Wundt, Jung - dedicated themselves to the realization and description of this 
very scheme. Its popularity can also be explained by the fact that this was a 
simple and comprehensible answer to the question being a concern of intel-
lectuals of that period (and the following period) - what makes people, when 
they are among the mass, act in one way and not the other?
  I would not dwell on this indeed very interesting topic but only note 
that Smith’s theory, which seeks the roots of understanding the nationality 
and nation in solidarity, is based on this explanatory recipe created in the 19-
20th centuries. The solidarity is a name coined in the second half of the 20th 
century for what was called psychology of masses by Freud and Jung. To make 
it clearer, by acknowledging the solidarity as a basis of a nation and national 
consciousness we acknowledge that there is something in each of us, which 
determines this solidarity and makes people strive towards unities. This is a 
psychic and psychologistic explanation: it should also be taken into account 
that there is no experimental evidence proving that this feature can be sep-
arated either psychically or genetically. The only thing which is clear about 
individuals’ unities is that an individual is the social being and cannot exist 
without the interaction with those who are alike. Solidarity is an important 
social construct but it is an entirely intelligible structure and is based on con-
scious decisions. Richard Rorty regards the citizens’ solidarity to each other as 
the main safeguard of democratic and liberal values7. It is therefore doubtful 
that the correct answer to Anthony Smith’s question could have been based 
on solidarity: a conscious decision cannot be a cause for rebellion and sacri-
fice. Such a thing is possible but in a smaller group of the people having re-
ceived a solid training in decision making. To become a nation, these people 
need to live in a highly developed society and a state as to extend this train-
ing to the majority of people. Yet, nationalistic explosions happen in modern 
times though mainly developing countries too.
But how to deal with those medieval texts which are understood by 
readers today as the germ of the idea of nation and nationalism? The answer 
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to this question should be sought in the structure of a medieval society: in 
percentage terms, the educated and better-off people who were literate and 
did not struggle for a daily survival would probably be less than 5 percent in 
each society. Of course, they shared a common ideology which varied from 
group to group and princedom to princedom though always revolved around 
the independence of a political entity. It can be argued whether a modern 
concept of a nation could be found in these texts but it is for sure that a con-
cept of a state and a common state ideology is in abundance there. This ideol-
ogy, given its benefits and prospects of achieving personal success, generated 
solidarity around this goal8. Such solidarity could be seen among those no-
bility and royal families who were engaged in developing the ideology, which 
is today perceived as an initial version of a national consciousness. Howev-
er, if analyzed from the political and not poetical standpoint, it will turn out 
that they needed this ideology to justify their expansionist politics and/or to 
secure greater autonomy from existing centers. A well-known phrase from a 
medieval Georgian work “The life of Grigol Khandzteli”, often quoted as a 
proof of the birth of a national consciousness (this phrase, in modern Geor-
gian language, says that Georgia is everywhere where sermons and prayers 
are in Georgian), is nothing else but the justifications of a future expansion-
ist politics by state ideologists. An indirect proof of it is that in the medieval 
ages, Georgians were actively engaged in building churches and monasteries 
in Middle East and Eastern Europe. It is difficult to assume any other rea-
son for this action save the aspiration to build up a strong physical and moral 
support for the future expansion. This was also the case in spreading protes-
tant ideas across central and northern Europe - Protestantism was the ideol-
ogy used by local feudal lords and royal families to gain greater independence 
and autonomy. This is the only explanation to a political support to Luther 
by German nobles and the success of Protestantism. Otherwise, there should 
not have been any support from or potential to understand a new doctrine 
by “common people” since the basic population of the medieval Europe was 
primarily focused on everyday life and was illiterate. 
 Even this cursory overview illustrates that the concepts of nation and 
nationality (whatever this construct is called in different languages) in the 
medieval ages is applied as an ideology, or, employing Marx’s definition, in-
verted reflection of social reality9. Social reality in medieval ages is in fact 
inverted against a national idea: nothing binds the majority of those people 
who live in a state but the belongingness to their living place. The sense of 
such unity, however, is clearly seen among the elite. Moreover, members of 
the elite in a more or less stable (and even unstable) states or princedoms 
were brought up under this ideology10. In this case it is obvious that what 
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appeared to be a cornerstone of the upbringing and thinking of the medieval 
elite reflected the social reality in an inverted manner. Everything that rep-
resented a superstructure - attributing concrete governance over woods, val-
leys and common people and marking them with this sign - was considered 
the basis of all these. As a rule, this was enhanced with a religious argument 
- being the Lord’s anointed. It was therefore possible for a state-nation ideo-
logical concept to emerge in the medieval ages, but the place of its emergence 
- the consciousness of an elite member - was incidental because of non-in-
stitutionalization of its spread among the elite itself. It may have worked as a 
construct in developing a personality of an elite member (provided that there 
was an established system of passing on the education/ideology at a concrete 
court), it also may have worked as a basis of solidarity and become such a 
construct which would determine the existence of a common political lan-
guage and common goals among the elite. These two radically different situ-
ations could have possibly coexisted within one elite system. That means that 
the elite may have consisted of the people for whom the idea of the nation-
state was a construct in developing their personality and also, of the people 
for whom this idea was the basis of solidarity alone. Since there was no such 
an established system of education in the medieval ages, which could have 
made this idea an institutionalized element for constructing a personality11, 
it can be assumed that the people, who regarded the idea of nation/state as 
the basis of solidarity alone, were more numerous in the elite than the people 
who could hardly imagine themselves without the idea of nation/state12. It 
will therefore be difficult to find a political elite in the medieval ages, which 
would not have an ideology suggesting different versions of state/nation and 
”Ein Volk, Ein Reich” concepts. Some of them would be too close to a mod-
ern concept of the nation, whilst others - too distant. But this closeness or 
distance is nothing else but the constructions determined by different his-
torical conditions. Religion, of course, plays a central role in each of this con-
structs, especially where a religious practice in a country provides the ground 
for being distinguished. In this case it is not the type of religion which mat-
ters but the potential in a social environment for the elite to use the religion 
as a basis for its exclusivity or claims. At a glance, Orthodox Christianity 
and Protestantism are the religions which could represent the basis for such 
exclusivity; however, the case with Ireland suggests that Catholicism versus 
Protestantism could also serve as a basis of such an ideology for the elite. In 
modern understanding a nation has two components: the concept of a nation 
itself, the construct of an idea, and a group of people seeing themselves as an 
integral part of this nation. It is also implied that the members of the nation, 
as a rule, belong in the nation by birth and the number of these members 
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shall exceed the number of people connected with family or kinship bonds. 
In order to elaborate on this second sign we should say that a person who at-
tributes herself to a certain nation, at the same time defines herself by means 
of the nation, i.e., identifies herself with a particular idea and history. Con-
sequently, a person distinguishes herself from those people whose identity is 
associated with other idea and history. 
*      *      *
Therefore, when we talk about the birth of a nation, we should take a 
separate look at the birth of these two components: 1) the birth of a nation’s 
ideology and 2) the birth of a nation’s identity. Historically, the birth of a na-
tion as of an ideology precedes the birth of a nation as of an identity. Any 
ideology, in order to become an identity, should be worked out as an ideology.
The division of a birth of a nation into the birth of an ideology and an 
identity will become clear after we consider the process of social life, which 
is called the creation of identities and the adoption of an identity by a con-
crete individual. Unfortunately, a uniform theory on identity, which would 
consider the identity as a social prescription and process, is not elaborated by 
the social science and therefore, a set of theoretical opinions provided below 
is the first attempt of doing this. An individual represents a complex of iden-
tities. Some of these identities are primary and they are acquired through so-
cial institutions (family), some are secondary, which are realized by a person 
by means of the involvement in various social institutions. Some identities 
are inevitably acquired in a concrete social structure (family, kinship, gender), 
others are acquired incidentally (professional, political and those, the acqui-
sition of which depend on the institutionalization of certain tendencies in a 
concrete society, for example, identity of sexual minorities).
As noted above any particular identity is acquired in a variety of ways. 
In order to make clear what the acquisition of an identity means it is bet-
ter to consider the process of acquiring (tacking up) identity by the example 
of our civilization and culture. It is necessary to identify ourselves with the 
family, or where we make our fist conscious movements. The acquisition of 
this identity, i.e., the realization that you are a member of a particular family 
and define yourself as such for yourself as well as for others, starts from birth, 
i.e., a primary socialization. The following identity, which we acquire, is de-
termined by the environment of my family. This means that whether or not 
we acquire a kinship identity, i.e., whether or not we stretch our own identity 
over the relatives of my family, depends on a concrete social environment. As 
a rule, however, a “next to family” identity is that of kinship. At the same time, 
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through the information and social links which we obtain, we acquire socio-
biological identities (a socio-biological identity [child] and gender identity). 
The acquisition of following identities is connected with those social insti-
tutions through which we become involved in a social environment. In our 
culture such social institutions are educational and mass media institution 
(i.e. institutions engaged in spreading/passing information and education). 
At this point we start acquiring a national identity. This may happen before 
we start attending the school or at the time we start attending the school. It 
is obvious that we do not perceive the concept of a nation incidentally - we 
perceive it on the basis of those principles on which the system of educa-
tion and spread of information are built. In Georgia these principles are de-
veloped consciously, for example, what a national curriculum or an editorial 
policy of a particular publisher or an electronic media should look like. After 
(or in parallel) we acquire this identity and define ourselves by it, we move 
to the stage of choosing professional, political or other (inclination) identi-
ties, which we choose, fit and if it does not suit us, change it and so on and 
so forth. The identities that always stay with us and are acquired without our 
decision are family, kinship, socio-biological and national identities. It is 
of course possible to change them too if a person decides so. The difference 
is that the acquisition of these four identities is not a matter of a decision. 
However, in certain cases, the place of a national identity can be occupied by 
an ethnical identity especially in cases of ethnically non-monolithic states. In 
such a case, a national identity will be a post ethnic identity, an upper struc-
ture in the formation of my personality.  
Of these five identities (family, kinship, socio-biological, ethnic and 
national), the rule and the content of the acquisition of two identities (eth-
nic and national) depend, to a greater extent, on particular political decisions 
and strategic views existing in a society, whilst those of the remaining three 
identities (family, kinship, socio-biological) - on social structures existing in 
a concrete society13. 
Consequently, our basic identities, i.e., the identities the selection or 
denial of which is not a normal rule of a social life, can be divided into two 
categories by their extent of dependence on social and political factors and 
can be named societal and politetal identities.
Looking at historical formation of identities, it could be said that so-
cietal identities are formed “naturally”, that is, unities of individuals are just 
enough to form them. As regards politetal identities, the basis for their exis-
tence and acquisition are political decisions and formal and informal educa-
tional and mass media institutional structures14.
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After a politetal identity emerges, an ideology becomes an identity, i.e., 
it turns over and stands onto feet again. When principles embedded in a na-
tional ideology are shared by large social groups, an idea construct is no lon-
ger an inverted reflection of a social reality (i.e., the ideas existing only among 
small elite groups are declared to be the property of larger social groups) but 
an adequate reflection of an existing social reality - when large social groups 
are indeed carriers of national identity whilst the elite ideology, which is 
based on a national identity, can represent the hyperbolization of the “situ-
ation existing in masses” (for example, fascism or modern terrorism) though 
still based on a real and not inverted premise - the fact of the existence of a 
national identity in the population.
If we look at a historical process of the formation of identities, we may 
develop a hypothesis that to that point in the past, which a historical eye of 
our culture can catch, societal identities have been perennial whilst politetal 
identities acquired. The reason of this is the means which strengthen and es-
tablish these identities. Family, socio-biological and clan identities do not 
need additional historical institutional bodies. These identities are established 
and acquired through the relationship between small groups of people where-
as the establishment of national and ethnic identities and their acquisition 
by larger groups of people require complex institutional as well as techno-
logical systems. Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner described two modes 
of these systems - education system and mass media. It is precisely through 
these two means that national and ethnic ideology can become an identity, 
that is, through the means and instruments for a large part of the population 
to self-determine and self-identify and also to distinguish themselves and 
their own communities from others.
We can conclude from all the above said that the history of the man-
kind is at the same time the process of accumulating societal and politetal 
identities, or, in other words, it is the process of building up layers of identi-
ties, and the development of a person reflects a historical development. The 
accumulation of identities begins with the acquisition of a family identity 
and ends, in our environment, with the acquisition of a national identity. If 
the establishment and spread of politetal identity depends on the content 
embodied in formal and informal education system and mass media, the 
next, future identities must be regional, global and, perhaps, world identities. 
However, to establish the latter, irrespective of relevant existing information 
system, it will be necessary to prove the existence of extraterrestrials, i.e., of 
aliens to this identity.
Thus we can define an identity as a complex of perceptions about our-
selves, our past, culture and future and anything - person/event/artifact - 
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falling beyond the reach/coverage of this area is unconditionally consid-
ered something alien. 
As seen from the above, a national identity originates incidentally, that 
means that it does not bring about itself the means of spreading but applies 
means of dissemination created as a result of political and technological pro-
cesses to turn an ideology into an identity.
 It is also obvious that no large, i.e., politetal identity has existed before 
these means of dissemination were created. To be more precise, there existed 
only its content in the form of the elite ideology.
Therefore, before finalizing this hypothesis, we should answer one ques-
tion: how necessary and irreversible it is, in historical as well as factual terms, 
in our environment to establish only a national identity as a politetal one. Is 
there anything else in our environment, which can become [or has already 
become and we are not aware of it] a large identity? Or is there any chance, 
even theoretical, for any construct to become a politetal identity?
 The answer to this question lies on the surface - we were talking about 
nationality as of a possible ideology of medieval elite. But there was an ideol-
ogy in the medieval ages, which unconditionally represented the ideology of 
all the elites (especially in medieval Europe). The medieval national ideology 
can be viewed as a particular case of that ideology. This ideology is religion. 
There is no doubt that the religion was the ideology of the elite and this is 
proved by numerous historical sources. But were the religiosity and religion 
a large identity at the same time?
Following the hypothesis which I am trying to develop, there were no 
conditions for a large identity to exist in the medieval ages. That means that 
there was no formalized or even informal but institutionalized system of edu-
cation which would cover large groups of people, nor was mass media which 
would give birth to a sense of unity and one entity. Churches and a network 
of religious institutions served the purpose of the enhancement and sustain-
ability of the elite and not the creation of a large identity, i.e., the role of the 
church was to spread the ideology among the elite rather than create a large 
identity.
*     *     *
Since 1970-es, after Peter Berger denied his thesis about the decline of 
religiousness in the world, especially, in developed countries15, scholars have 
been studying more thoroughly the medieval ages and, especially, the role of 
the religion in this epoch16. The conclusion drawn from their studies clearly 
shows that an almost two-century-old opinion of scholars and philosophers 
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that the medieval ages was a religious epoch where people’s identity was en-
tirely determined by the religion was a mistake and the shift of parameters of 
our reality onto the medieval ages17. The search for the roots of this mistake 
will probably lead us to Voltaire and Hegel, to the constructs which they de-
fined - by requiring to end the epoch of belief and begin the epoch of reason 
by the former and describing the steps of reasoning and establishing prin-
cipal sameness of these steps by the latter. The most apparent victim of this 
mistake was Benedict Anderson who built a correct conclusion of his own 
theory upon a wrong basis - on the existence of a large religious identity in 
the medieval ages18. 
However, this is the topic for another paper. What is interesting from 
this discourse is that the time when the religion developed into a large iden-
tity coincides with the epoch when the nationality becomes a large identity. 
The religion had just never had any other possibility to become a politetal 
identity. Various empirical studies19 also prove that if we want to discuss the 
religion as a politetal identity, this is possible only in our environment and 
not in any of the past - medieval or pre-medieval epochs.
Thus, with the coming of the epoch of the institutionalized system of 
education and global information means, we obtained the possibility of two 
politetal identities - national and religious. Why these two and not any other? 
The answer to this question is simple: there could be only two types of state 
ideology at that time as well as today, national and religious, which could have 
been spread through the education system and got formalized in mass media. 
That means that there were in total two ideologies that represented possible 
and actual identities of the elites. Accordingly, only two ideologies could have 
become a politietal, large identity. In some countries these two ideologies co-
incided whilst in others, contradicted each other and the elite had to make a 
conscious or spontaneous choice.
It should also be noted that there could be an ideology of the elite with-
out nationality in the medieval ages but there was no and could not be a na-
tional ideology without religiosity. 
Therefore, with the coming of the time for large identities, politicians 
started installing their own ideology into the education system and mass 
media. In case of some complex social systems (for example, empires) several 
ideologies could have spread simultaneously and in such a case the ideolo-
gies competed with each other to become an identity. It is therefore histori-
cally predetermined and inevitable that in some countries a politetal identity 
is religion whereas in others - national. That’s why the transformation of a 
religion into a politetal identity is perceived as nationalism in some, for ex-
ample, eastern countries. In fact this is nothing else but a politetal identity 
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which emerged in this social structure as a result of the installation of a for-
malized system of education and mass media caused by globalization or any 
other reason.
Therefore, globally as well as locally, the coming of the epoch of po-
litetal identity does not automatically mean the arrival of the epoch of na-
tionalism. In our environment, the nationalism among intellectual circles is 
very often acknowledged as a product of a developed society whilst religiosity 
- the outcome of the society of a so-called lower stage. As a survey conducted 
and the hypothesis developed by us suggest, this link is incidental. Moreover, 
the nationalism can be replaced by religiosity in a relatively brief period and 
vice versa if a corresponding political decision is taken and necessary human 
and material resources are available.
Moreover, the upsurge in religiosity in modern developed societies20, 
which, at a glance, seems hard to explain, indicates about the change in po-
litetal identity and the roots of this change should be sought in information 
means and formal and informal education systems of these societies21.
*     *     *
In the light of all the above said it is clear when a Georgian large iden-
tity emerged. We can say with quite a high historical precision when this 
ideology, which was quite developed and established in the Georgian elite, 
started to transform into a large identity. I think that this identity started to 
emerge in the second half of the 19th century - at the time when first Geor-
gian newspapers were published whilst the beginning of the transformation 
of an ideology into an identity is directly linked with the establishment of 
The Society for the Spreading of Literacy Among Georgians and the step-
up of the Society’s activity. Thus, The Society for the Spreading of Literacy 
Among Georgians was indeed “the school of the Georgian nation”22 but not 
in the sense that the majority of the Georgian nation studied there but in the 
sense that the Georgian nation came out of this school, i.e., the Georgian na-
tion was born and brought up in The Society for the Spreading of Literacy 
Among Georgians.
*     *     *
But an issue we are going to raise now is about the content of this large 
identity. During the times of the Russian empire and the Soviet rule, the na-
tionality, as a large politetal identity, was spread and established as, perhaps, 
a specific ethnic identity, along with inflexible efforts to spread a Soviet na-
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tional identity. Before the Soviet rule, it should be said in favour of the Rus-
sian empire, that the emerging Georgian identity was, in principle, in har-
mony with the Russian imperial identity - the Georgian elite was serene 
about the membership of the Russian empire - and was trying to transform 
its own ideology into an ethnical-politetal identity23. The Soviet education 
system tried to do the same what the Russian empire did but due to various 
political or subjective reasons, the formation of an ethnical politetal identi-
ty, undertaken by Georgian enlighteners during the Soviet epoch because of 
the confrontation of a Georgian intellectual elite with the Soviet Union and 
also the incidental or deliberate weakness of the state control over the lit-
erature and history syllabuses in the education system, turned into the pro-
cess of the formation of national identity with the demand of the creation of 
an own, national state. This demand had first become the elite ideology and 
then, from the early 1970-es, through the education system and mass media, 
a politetal identity. It can be said that in the late 1980-es the Soviet politetal 
identity was defeated once and for all in Georgia. At the same time, con-
structs of the criminal world started creeping into the construct of a national 
identity, which was linked to the cult of thieves in law, having developed over 
the years, and was the result of it.
It is quite difficult today to say anything about a national identity that 
was spread in the 1980-es in Georgia. However, some reconstruction is pos-
sible through the analysis of the press and other print editions. One thing is 
clear: by the end of 1980-es a religious component in the Georgian national 
ideology was completely subordinated to the national component due to an 
obvious links of clergy with the security services, on the one hand, and to a 
strict control of the religion and the church by the Soviet authorities, on the 
other. Besides, structurally the Soviet religious policy was ecumenist and was 
in principle against facilitating any religion to become a politetal identity.
The next issue is about our modern politetal identity. After the break-
up of the Soviet Union, the technology for establishing a politetal identity has 
become available. This means that in Georgia a religious ideology got access 
to the same means of spreading and becoming an identity that were available 
to a national ideology before. The survey of values of the Georgian society24 
conducted in 2006 suggested that out of studied 39 values and institutions25 
Christian Orthodox and religiosity values participate in an imagined con-
struction of the 2/3 of the surveyed on an equal standing with the statehood 
and traditional values. We can consequently assume that the politetal identity 
of Georgians started to change in early 1990-es and the construction of this 
new form has not probably completed yet. Given the instruments available to 
the state and the church for installing the ideology and transforming it into 
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an identity, it would not be difficult to conclude that nowadays the church is 
winning in this competition and the nationality is being subordinated to re-
ligiosity. There are five signs of this in our environment:
1. The accord over the ideology among the majority in the church;
2. Undeveloped national ideology in the state authority;
3. The strength of instruments for the transformation of 
the ideology into an identity by the church (high prestige 
of churches, informal education conducted by churches, 
system of dissemination of spiritual publications);
4. The weakness of instruments for the transformation 
of the national ideology into an identity by the state 
(low prestige of schools and content of textbooks) 
and the involvement of the subjects engaged in this 
sphere (teachers) primarily in congregations;
5. Involvement of mass media representatives (journalists) 
in congregations and thus in churches, which is not 
the case with regard to the state authorities. 
Thus we are at a very interesting stage of the history of our politetal 
identity. It is clear that in the competition for a large politetal identity the 
church has been gaining an upper hand so far and subordinating the national 
component. The time will show what will happen in the foreseeable future - 
will it be possible to strike a balance between national and religious ideolo-
gies or will the national ideology prevail again. This depends on many things, 
first and foremost, on social and educational policies pursued by the state.
Notes:
1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Naitonalism, Oxford 2004.
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London 2005.
3 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Cambridge 2001. 
4 See the works of Renan, Kedourie, Seton-Watson et al.
5 I do not discuss here Hobsbawm’s theory (Nations and Nationalism since 
1780, Cambridge 1992, which is, in principle, a clarification of Gellner’s 
theory.
6 A German original text and two translations, English and Russian, are in-
teresting in a sense that the key word of this paragraph differs in the trans-
lations. The Russian translation is adequate to the original whereas in the 
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authorized English translation the phrase “nations’ (peoples’) psychology” is 
replaced by the name of a field of science - “social psychology”. This can be 
explained by misunderstanding of the English language context by Freud or 
by the fact that five years later of the German publication of Totem and Ta-
boo, Freud grew stricter towards his method and regarded it as being only 
fit, save the room of a psychoanalyst, for analyzing approaches developed in 
cultures (for example, social psychology). It could however be the matter of 
a mere lack of attention. Especially given that the following sentence (“If 
psychic processes of one generation...”) is translated without an alteration. 
 “Allein eine weitere Erwaegung zeigt, das wir die Varaentwortlich-
keit fuer solche Kuenheit nicht allein zu tragen haben. Ohne die An-
nahme einer Massenpsyche, einer Kontinuitaet in Gefuehlsleben der Men-
schen, welche gestattet, sich ueber die Unterbrechnungen der seelischer 
akte durch das Vergehen der Individuen hinwegzusetzen, kann die Voelk-
erpsychologie ueberhaupt nicht bestehen. Setzen sich durch die psychisch-
en Prozesse der einen Generation nicht auf naechste fort, mueste jede 
ihre Einstellung zum Leben neu erwerben, so gaebe es auf diesem Ge-
biet keinen Frtschritt und keine Entwiklung.” in: Sigmund Freud, To-
tem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Sava-
ges and Neurotics, trans. by A. A. Brill, New York, 1918, p. 260. 
 “But further consideration shows that we our selves do not have to 
carry the whole responsi bility for such daring. Without the assumption of 
a mass psyche, or a continuity in the emotional life of mankind which per-
mits us to dis regard the interruptions of psychic acts through the transgres-
sion of individuals, social psychology could not exist at all. If psychic proc-
esses of one generation did not continue in the next, if each had to ac-
quire its attitude towards life afresh! there would be no progress in this 
field and almost no development.” Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Re-
semblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics, trans. by A. 
A. Brill, New York, 1918, p. 260. The Russian translation reads: “Однако, 
дальнейшие соображения показывают, что не нам одним приходится 
нести ответственность за подобную смелость. Без допущения массовой 
психики, непрерывности в жизни чувств людей, дающей возможность 
не обращать внимания на прерываемость душевных актов, вследствие 
гибели индивидов, психология народов вообще не может существовать. 
Если бы психические процессы одного поколения не находили бы своего 
продолжения в другом, если бы каждое поколение должно было заново 
приобретать свою направленность к жизни, то в этой области не было 
бы никакого прогресса и почти никакого развития”, trans. by M. Wolfe, 
see: http://www.pseudology.org/Psyhology/Freid_TotemTaboo/index.htm.
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